This contribution focuses on the transport of passengers on international routes and the legal regime set down by the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and reinforced by the Montréal Convention of 1999. These Conventions regulate commercial aviation by detailing a set of minimum standardised procedures for flight safety, such as standards for air navigation systems, amongst others, to ensure safe and efficient air travel.
Introduction
In the first half of the 20 th century, due to outbreak of the First and Second World Wars and the use of aircraft for military purposes, innovations took place in plane design, which changed the nature of military and civil aviation. The improvement in plane design meant that carrying capacity increased. Countries could transport passengers and mail across longer distances, allowing for cross-continental flights. This contribution focuses on the transport of passengers on international routes and the legal regime set down by the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and reinforced by the Montréal Convention of 1999. These Conventions regulate commercial aviation by detailing a set of minimum standardised procedures for flight safety, such as standards for air navigation systems, amongst others, to ensure safe and efficient air travel.
The legal regime also regulates the possible claims that may be made against airlines for the death of or harm to passengers, as well as relating to damage to and loss of baggage. The regime not only limits claims temporally and by location, but it also excludes the application of national legal regimes. With regard to claims of harm to dignity the regime disallows such claims to be brought within the restrictions placed by the legal regimes or on any other basis.
The above restrictions and exclusions may be simply illustrated thus. John and Thabo are travelling from Johannesburg to Shanghai and John had asked for a vegetarian meal. John is told his meal option is not available. John feels mental anguish. Thabo, on the other hand, gets bumped by the food trolley, and his hand is slightly injured. As they disembark in Shanghai, John hurts his leg as the aerobridge is not secured closely enough to the airplane. Upon their return to Johannesburg, both John and Thabo would like to sue for the harm they suffered. Thabo will be told by his lawyers that he has a case against the airline. John will have a case for the leg injury against the airport authority in Shanghai, but no case against the airline. The food mix-up and the bump by the trolley both occurred on the plane, while both passengers travelled on an international flight. John's claim is excluded, and he may further not put forward a delictual claim.
The contribution does not address the full coverage of these Conventions, only the exclusion of mental / emotional injuries. The Convention excludes emotional harm from the definition of death and physical harm. However claimants have brought claims to undermine the main exclusion of claims with regard to compensation for emotional harm. This contribution explores the exclusion of claims in the Warsaw and Montréal Conventions and thereafter analyses two court decisions in common law countries where this exclusion of claims was challenged and the challenge failed. However the obiter dictum in the cases does indicate a change in the attitude towards the ethical validity of the exclusion. The judicial mood and tone in the judgements sets up the conclusion of this contribution, which endeavours to clarify the possible way forward in decision-making with respect to the exclusion.
Warsaw and Montréal Convention limitations and exclusions
The The Warsaw Convention specifically provided this in a 24 and the Montreal Convention in a 29.
5
In the Warsaw Convention according to a 21 the carrier could raise the defence that the injured passenger caused or contributed to the injury, and could thus be exonerated in part or wholly. The Montreal Convention states the same in a 20.
6
In the Warsaw Convention, a 17; also in the Montreal Convention, a 17.
7
In this contribution I will provide the correlating article in the Warsaw Convention in footnotes.
R DE GAMA PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 4 contribution, therefore, reference will be made to the articles contained in the Montréal Convention only, namely article 29, 8 which is the basis of all and any claims in a court of law, and which must be read with article 21(1), 9 which deals with compensation for injury or death.
In article 29 10 of the Montréal Convention the basis of any and all claims is limited to the Convention only.
In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention … Article 21 11 sets out further limitations on the compensation for strict liability and fault liability by specifically stating:
For damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 not exceeding 100,000 Special Drawing Rights for each passenger, the carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit its liability. 12 Article 21(2) 13 does allow for a liability which exceeds the 100,000 Special Drawing Rights the carrier may bring into fault liability. It is important to note that this is allowed from the point where the damages exceed 100,000 Special Drawing Rights. 
Provenance of the assault
With the exponential increase in air travel since the Warsaw Convention, the limitations have been questioned in the last two decades. Initially the need to protect the fledging air transport sector was instrumental in making agreement on the limitations possible, and later the involvement of public monies may have played a role. 16 The protection of the fledging aviation industry was a initially priority, 17 especially as it was accepted that there was a need to severely limit emotional damage in the same manner 14 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention sets out exclusions as follows: "The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking". as the other damages were limited. 18 The adherence to this position in the 1999 Montréal Convention is controversial, however, as the initial ratio for the limitation has fallen away. 19 The negotiation of Montréal Convention specifically points to this controversy. 20 The purpose of the Convention was to modernise the regulation of an industry that was well established. 21 As the proceeding cases will show, the limitations in place under the Warsaw Convention were very restrictive. There are limitations on what kind of harm is claimable and on the amounts claimable. The travaux preparatoire clearly show a discussion specifically on the exclusion of claims for mental injury by the majority of the state parties. In fact, nearly all states agreed that the exclusion was no longer necessary. 22 It was clear to the chairman of the conference that the delegates had agreed to broaden the ground for claims. 23 The only vocal critic was the IATA observer. 24 The issue for the delegates was really only how to word the inclusion of mental injury. There were divergent proposals as to how the provision should be formulated. 25 In fact the retention of the wording employed in Warsaw is actually surprising if one reads the discussion that occurred over the 18 days of the convention. The wording as retained allows for claims for mental (inclusive of emotional) harm if it flows from physical injury.
The two possible issues that would give rise to the ethical questionability are; one that emotional harm claims are excluded altogether not only under the Convention but through the use of any other laws. Second, even if allowed under very limited circumstances there are limitations on the amount claimable. This case note sets out the recent case law on the former. The cases deal with the possibility of claiming outside of the purview of the Convention which allows for claims for bodily harm only. The drafting and redrafting of a 17 in the pre-Montreal days, trying to modernise the Warsaw Convention piecemeal through many amendments, give credence to this statement. Abeyratne 2000 J Air L & Com 226-227. 21 This sentiment is expressed in the preamble thus "RECOGNIZING the need to modernize and Consolidate the Warsaw Convention and related instruments …". 
Siddhu and Floyd
Though these cases are 20 years old and were decided under the Warsaw Convention, a short foray into the reasons for the decisions is necessary. Both cases dismissed claims for psychological injury that was not linked to any physical injury or to the physical injury actually suffered. In the Floyd case, great mental trauma was suffered by the passengers when the engines of the plane failed, they were told that there would be an emergency landing in the Atlantic Ocean, but the engines were eventually restarted and the plane landed at Miami Airport, the airport of departure. 40 The Supreme Court in United States ruled that there was no claim and it, too, based its decision on the Convention and the traveuax preparatoire. 41 It was noted in the Siddhu decision that even though the Convention refers in its title to "certain rules", the first article specifically states that the Convention applies to all international air carriage. 42 Secondly, it is necessary to note that the Convention is a harmonisation of particular rules, and therefore those oset down are the only agreed rules for that specific situation. 43 In Floyd, too, the Supreme Court found that mental injury was not a consideration 44 and that the emphasis in the drafting of the Convention had been on protecting a fledgling industry. 45 The meaning of the phrase "however founded" and the exclusion to be found therein were the main focus of the judgment. The wording of the English translation was compared with that of the initial French wording "à quelque titre que ce soit ", as found in article 24. The exclusion of any other basis of action, contractual or delictual, if an international carriage by air is undertaken has to be read with the restricted wording of "bodily harm" or lésion corporelle as set out in article 17.
… leur transport peut être régi par la Convention de Varsovie qui, en général, limite la responsabilité du transporteur en cas de mort ou de lésion corporelle, ainsi qu'en cas de perte ou d'avarie des bagages. 46 The cases that are the foremost authority (régi) interpreted the term "en cas" to cover only cases where a passenger died or where bodily harm occurred during international carriage by air. Lord Hope found that there was no difference in meaning between the official French text and the translated English text and that both meant that the Convention would apply exclusively on matters of international carriage by air, and for cases where harm or injury to passengers had occurred such injury had to relate to a physical injury. The House of Lords stated:
[it] was not designed to provide remedies against the carrier to enable all losses to be compensated. It was designed instead to define those situations in which compensation was to be available. So it set out the limits of liability and the conditions under which claims to establish that liability, if disputed, were to be made. A balance was struck, in the interests of certainty and uniformity. 47 The impact of the balance, unfair as it may seem, could not be avoided, in that the claim for compensation under any other law, including English law, would fail.
All the obvious cases in which the carrier ought to accept liability were provided for. But, as one of the French delegates to the Warsaw Convention, Mr. Ripert, observed when the definition of the period of carriage was being discussed, there are an infinite variety of cases not all of which can be put in the same formula. No doubt the domestic courts will try, as carefully as they may, to apply the wording of article 17 to the facts to enable the passenger to obtain a remedy under the Convention. But it is conceded in this case that no such remedy is available. 48 This judgement of the highest court in England set the course for future interpretation.
46
The French text of the Warsaw Convention is the authoritative text.
47
Siddhu 442.
48
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The Supreme Court limited its investigation to the meaning of lesion corporelle and the exclusion of mental injury. However Floyd did allow for a small glimmer.
[W]e express no view to whether passengers can recover for mental injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries. 49
Potgieter 50
This case was decided in the South African High Court in the Cape in 2005, 51 where Judge Davis had to decide whether or not to uphold an exception to a claim under actio inuriarum 52 under South African common law. 53 The exception was that the Warsaw Convention applied exclusively and that there was no claim under any other law that could be brought. 54 The incident occurred on a flight from Cape Town to London. The plaintiff was traveling with his mother and his boyfriend. When the announcement that the plane would shortly land at London Heathrow was made he kissed his boyfriend. He was told by the flight attendant to stop, as his action was making other people uncomfortable, and was told again by a senior flight attendant when he ignored the first request. This was a humiliating and traumatising experience. The plaintiff felt hurt and claimed that his dignity had been violated.
The claim was brought under the South African delict actio inuriarum. 55 Actio inuriarum is defined as …the action for damages open to a plaintiff who can show that the defendant has committed an intentional wrongful act, which constitutes an aggression upon his person, dignity or reputation. 56 The plaintiff argued that the Convention had to be interpreted as dealing with certain types of incidents only, and that other incidents should be allowed to be brought under national laws as applicable. The incident was evaluated in the light of the Montréal Convention, as England had adopted that Convention. However, the operative concepts are no different and therefore the claim was found to be wanting.
The sentiment of the majority decision, though it applied the interpretation in Sidhhu, can be discerned from the following statement:
The embarrassment and humiliation which Mr Stott suffered were exactly what the EC and United Kingdom Disability Regulation were intended to prevent. I share the regret 75 of the lower courts that damages were not available as recompense for his ill treatment and echo their sympathy, but I agree with the reasoning of their judgement and would dismiss this appeal. This interpretation of the different meaning of the word delay under the two instruments is fascinating, as up to now the Montréal or the Warsaw definitions have been read restrictively and the exclusions are read broadly. This is easily discerned from the cases discussed above that dealt with emotional harm. In the reading relating to the issues of delay and cancellation, though the Montréal Convention deals with delay, albeit in an oblique manner, the meaning of delay is found to be different and distinct from that in Regulation 261/2004. The Court of Justice of the EU describes the hairline fracture separating the two instruments thus:
The specific obligation to pay compensation, imposed by Regulation No 261/2004, does not arise from each actual delay, but only from a delay which entails a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours in relation to the time of arrival originally scheduled. In addition, whereas the extent of the delay is normally a factor increasing the likelihood of greater damage, the fixed compensation awarded under that Regulation remains unchanged in that regard, since the duration of the actual delay in excess of three hours is not taken into account in calculating the amount of compensation payable under This ability on the part of the CJEU to interpret a regional regulation, separating it from the international Convention and the rules therein, to create ab initio a claimable right for passengers demonstrates how the claims for emotional harm may be accommodated at the regional level at the CJEU.
Conclusion
In order to link the Conventions, cases and Regulation 261/2004, the following overview is necessary. The Conventions set out restrictions with respect to the amount claimable upon harm to passengers and damage to luggage. There is a specific exclusion for harm that cannot fall within the term "bodily". The exclusion is wide in that it excludes not only claims under the Convention but also any claims under any other law. This has been the interpretation thus far.
Passengers have brought cases which were dismissed but which highlighted this discrepancy and unfairness. Until Stott, it seemed that the traditional view as set out in Siddhu would prevail until such time as States would sit down and reconfigure the existing Convention or agree to a new Convention with such claims allowed. In Stott it is not only the vocal criticism of the minority judgement of Lady Hale (which raises the spectre of an unassailable rule, ergo omnes) that gives hope to future plaintiffs but also the majority judgement.
The unfairness of the Convention in first excluding a claim within the legal regime as well as outside of it has become more and more apparent. One has only to read the regret and sympathy that was expressed in the Stott judgment to realise that there seems to be a change in sentiment, if not in law.
The right against torture in international law, which is a rule ergo omnes that is to be adhered to by all states, is perhaps a viable option to overcome the apparent unfairness inherent in the application of the Conventions. Torture has a wide definition, and includes the mental anguish associated with bodily harm, but suffering indignity on its own could also be construed to be akin to a form of torture. Though the right not to be tortured is accepted under customary international law as ergo omnes, the definition of the term torture is still in dispute. The wider definition is accepted by some, though it is not the definitive definition. 83 Plaintiffs would still have to argue and convince a judge that the mental anguish and the indignity they have suffered qualify as torture. 84 However if the plaintiff is successful in drawing this conclusion, a judge is left with no choice but to find that a right has been violated. Assessing the value to put upon such a violation would be the next interesting part of such a case. There may, however, be an act outside of court that may change the decision-making in this regard. The European Commission may intervene, as it has done with delays and cancellations. The basis of such an intervention would be the interest of the consumers of this service, and the intervention may take the form of laying down a specific minimum level of behaviour and violation of that behaviour to be claimable. That is, the Disability Regulation may be given more weight. This would change one aspect; a judge would not be able to easily dismiss the claim as allowed by the EU Commission. The restricted demarcation of the exclusion by the Regulation would in an indirect manner change the way the Convention is applied in national courts. The traditional view would fail.
83
The definition of the term torture in the Convention is an interesting compromise, especially when read with the reference to exclusion based on lawful sanctions and the linkage required to public officials. "Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person, information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions." The final possibility is that state parties to Montréal might renegotiate the Treaty, either by adding a protocol, as was done over time with the Warsaw Convention, providing grounds for claims, or through a complete renegotiation. This final possibility is the least likely with an aviation sector under strain and in need of protection due to the worldwide recession.
Change is the only constant and will happen even in this specific area.
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